David Kline (dkline) Mon Sep 24 '01 (09:26) 23 lines Best news I've seen since Sept. 11 is today's front page New York Times headline: "U.S. Seeks Afghan Coalition Against Taliban." It appears that Washington does indeed recognize that the only way to get Bin Laden is through the anti-Taliban resistance on the ground. As for closing the borders, forget it. It won't happen because it *can't* happen -- there are ten thousand crossing points and only 100 are manned by Pakistani border police. Starving frightened people will flee. And the Paks (and, I guess, us) will simply have to deal with it. As for Rabanni, he's the favorite of at least one Afghan -- a former member of the fundamentalist Hezbi Islami group -- who began emailing me yesterday. I didn't know he was still alive (we had travelled into the war zone together in 83-84), but even though from the more religious side of the anti-Soviet resistance, he says Afghans would welcome US help to overthrow the Taliban so long as we respect Afghan sovereignty and work *with* the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban forces. He also says an immediate dispatch of even 5,000 metric tons of wheat to the Afghans would earn us "much love," as he puts it, from the people. .

David Kline: makes a good point about what we'd do if the Pak nuclear capability fell into fundamentalist hands. Except who's to say that it's not already in fundamentalist hands (albeit fundamentalist military men, who at least have some discipline in them)? I'm not sure what the dividing line is between semi-security vs. great risk where Pak nukes are concerned. As for anti-US sentiments among Afghans, everything I have ever known or experienced or heard about that country (whether 20 years ago or last night) suggests that so long as we don't bomb indiscriminately or invade with ground troops, they will welcome our support and assistance. No matter what people may have thought in 1996, it seems clear from all reports that Afghans despise their current Taliban rulers. So they'd like our help so long as we respect their sovereignty and right to decide their own future. Especially they'd like our help in rebuilding. You cannot imagine what it is like to be in a country where there is zero medical care, zero education, and if things get even worse, zero food. They just want peace. A chance to go back to their farms and villages. They don't want to live in the 7th century -- it's taken too long (1400 years) to get away from the Dark Ages. Who wants to go back? No video? No media? No phones? Impossible -- the Afghans (especially Pathans) are among the chattiest storytelling people I've ever met. Contradictions? Sure. Afghans I speak with today LOVE America and love Americans and even love our gregarious bravado. But they hate the CIA, hate what we did re: the Shah of Iran, hate our oft-imperial arrogance. Gee, they sound just like me!

David Kline (dkline) Fri Sep 28 '01 (08:23) 90 lines People have been saying here that the Taliban brought peace out of chaos in Afghanistan and how do we know that the Northern Alliance or anyone else would be better? Let's look at what actually happened pre-Taliban, because I think it provides a clue as to the governing capabilities of the Northern Alliance and other non-Taliban forces. First of all, what is now called the Northern Alliance was actually a coalition government that had been formed and was operating rather remarkably well for a time. Think of it, more than a half-dozen rebel groups had somehow put aside their differences and come together -- Massoud's group, Saiyaf's group, Rabbani's group, the legendary Abdul Haq's forces, even little Gailani's group -- and they were more or less managing things in Kabul, even rotating leaders (I know, that's a sign of weakness, but it's better than fighting) just to keep things together. Then what happens? That fucker Hekmatyar, Pakistan's little puppet, the schmuck who received 75% of the arms and aid (thanks to the Pak SIS) but did only 2% of the fighting against the Russians, starts shelling Kabul. Backs out of & suddenly refuses to support the coalition government once his turn in power ends. And since he's Pakistan's dog and always has been (many who've met him, including me, believe he is actually clinically insane), he immediately gets Pakistan's support and steps up the shelling of Kabul and begins to throw everything into chaos. That's how the chaos began, at Pakistan's urging & initiative through their decades-long puppet Gulbudin Hekmatyar. Of course, when the even more fanatical and malleable (Hekmatyar is insane, after all) assholes of the Taliban raise their ugly heads, Pakistan switches support to them. Pakistan's own military and intelligence services are run by Taliban funamentalist-style sympathizers, so it's an easy decision for them. And when I say Pakistan "supported" them (or Hekmatyar before them), you have to realize what that means in a country with almost zero infrastructure, more than a million dead, starving widows filling the streets, and hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees pouring back into the country from camps in Pakistan eager to go back to their farms. "Support" means heavy artillery, air support, air *transport* (which is maybe even more important), food, medical supplies, diplomatic cover and support, legal entry for aid workers, and oh yes -- did I mention actual Pakistani military regiments actually engaged in fighting the forces of Massoud and the other coalition members? Yep, Pak troops on the ground turning a shaky but working & operating Afghan order into total chaos. So gee, I guess those forever-quarreling Afghans couldn't keep their shit together, could they? Tsk, tsk, what's wrong with those people? So anyway, the legitimate government's authority broke down, and what few services remained ceased. And when the Pakistani army and its Taliban front men stepped up to the plate and said, "How'd y'all like some food and electricity again?" the bludgeoned population didn't say no. Fuck, why the hell not? Anything ... just stop shelling us! So the Taliban take over, and of course the people never got their electricity because it might be used to watch TV or something. So to recap, the so-called Northern Alliance was a coalition that I wasn't sure could ever possibly be formed. But it was formed, and it worked against unbelievable odds and incredible amounts of Pakistani sabotage for quite a while, until finally overwhelmed and overthrown by the Paks and their Taliban puppets. It was and still is recognized as the legitimate government of Afghanistan by 46 nations and has Afghanistan's UN seat, whereas the Taliban are recognized now by only 1 nation (guess which one) and has no UN seat. So in my view, not only would ousting the Taliban and restoring the legitimate recognized government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan under Rabbani would be far preferable to what exists now, it also happens to be the LEGALLY-CORRECT thing to do under international law. And frankly, given what they faced, I thought they did a pretty good job of holding things together for 4 years or so until the Pak's finally overwhelmed them. I wouldn't be worried to see them back in power, especially because the population is now even more tired and beaten and willing to put minor squabbles aside just to FUCKING BREATHE again! So next time someone says "The Taliban brought peace where there was chaos," think about what actually happened. Think about Hitler bringing "peace" to France in 1940, America restoring "peace" to Saigon in 1963, blah blah blah. The Afghans will do just fine, I believe, once the Taliban are gone. But only if we and other countries help them rebuild, and only if we respect their sovereignty and let them govern themselves.

Kline (dkline) Fri Sep 28 '01 (11:58) 20 lines It's also not true that the Northern Alliance (aka Islamic State of Afghanistan) has no Pathans (or Pushtuns). When they were a coalition gov't still in power, they certainly did. Rabbani may be Pathan and Saiyaf as well plus Abdul Haq, too. I don't recall for sure. When the press refers to the NA as non-Pathan, what they mean is that it is composed *primarily* of or *led by* Hazarras, Uzbecks, Tajiks and other non-Pathan minorities. But they do have quite a few Pathan rank and file. Still, the point is well taken about needing to ally with groups that many Pathans feel more identified with tribally. Zahir Shah, if he plays a role in uniting with the NA and other anti-Taliban forces, is a Durrani Pathan. By the way, even the Pathans are divided between the Durrani and other tribal lines. You could split hairs and get Afghans feuding very easily -- and indeed, that's what the Paks and Taliban counted on. The task, as always for the Afghans, is to unite despite their tribal differences and fight the greater enemy -- whether the Brits & Russians before, or the Paks and Taliban today.

David Kline (dkline) Sun Sep 30 '01 (09:19) 25 lines That's for sure. But seriously, just in case someone does know the difference between Jamiat Islami and Jamiat-i-Ulam and which one dominates the Pak military and supports the Taliban most strongly, I'd love to hear. I could, of course, simply research it myself. But I'm too tired, and frankly I'm really sick of those people. So if someone knows, then great. Some journalist I am, eh? Anyway, I heard a nurse from Medicins sans Frontiers on NPR yesterday and she reminded me of things I'd forgotten about the Afghans: How they love to sing, how they're always and I mean always listening to music (I never once saw a mujahadeen jeep, bus, truck or even captured Soviet tank that hadn't been outfitted with tape player and speakers), how they're always playing games (chess, dominoes, cards, etc.), and how they absolutely positively adore dancing at weddings! All banned now under the Taliban. Maybe it's because life is so austere there, but when the chance comes to have fun, the Afghans *really* have fun. Or at least they used to. And some wonder, gee don't most Afghans really support the Taliban?

Back in the modern world, today's papers say Washington will support the anti-Taliban rebels, who met in Rome yesterday with the former King to work out some sort of United Front. Included as aid recipients are Abdul Haq and unspecified other forces as well as the Northern Alliance. They will also provide humanitarian aid quickly. So I've got to rewrite my op-ed now, because it looks like Washington did rebuff Pakistan protests against the US taking any such action. Three weeks ago I would never have imagined that the Bush administration could resist striking out blindly and instead make such a complex move. What's happening here. Are we getting a government with a brain? Next thing you know, Powell will be apologizing for the Shah of Iran and pledging to make our foreign policy more Islamic-friendly.

I asked David Kline about a snippet I heard on AM radio this morning about some great Afghan leader making a comeback and here is what he said: David Kline (dkline) Tue Oct 2 '01 (11:12) 7 lines Abdul Haq, maybe. A very great commander who left the country in disgust after the post-Soviet factional fighting and rise of the Taliban. If it's the same guy, he lost half-a-foot during the war, and earned enormous respect as a leader. But truthfully, I don't know his tribal affiliation (he may be Pathan) or who much influence he might now wield. But it's good that he's coming back & joining forces with others.

David Kline (dkline) Wed Oct 3 '01 (17:23) 34 lines God, I have no idea anymore. Other than that Afghans have always been very media conscious -- they listen to radio, watch TV, read papers. Those that can read, I mean. As for Taliban anti-aircraft capabilities, I think we'll soon find that their capabilities around the flanks and forward margins of their control are very thin, indeed. Some artillery to shell Bagram for effect, some anti-aircraft capability here and there, but most of their real strength will be concentrated around Kandahar and to a lesser extent Kabul. That's where they'll put up serious resistance. And if reports today of significant military gains by the Northern Alliance are true, then we'll see a rapid withering of their abilities beyond those 2 cities. They may not even fight that hard for Kabul, in fact. With Pakistani military support now unavialable, these people truly are ignorant village idiots who mainly just want to protect their mullah boss Omar. They don't care about big cities, they don't care about "strategic" positions. All they want is for their allmighty mullah to be safe. So, Question for the day: Which comes first -- the capture & execution of Bin Laden, or the overthrow of the Taliban? Until now, I'd always expected a US-Afghan alliance to grab Bin Laden first, then go for state power (maybe with UN assistance). But hell, if the Taliban start crumbling and the Paks stay out of the way, it could go the other way, couldn't it? Seize state power -- then really seal the borders and close the pincer around Bin Laden and his boys. My, that would be a lovely affair!

David Kline (dkline) Fri Oct 5 '01 (09:00) 30 lines That's a very good question . I don't really know. Maybe has some ideas. I do agree, of course, that Pakistan's trouble with its own fundamentalist forces does NOT fit the classic dictatorship vs. people model. For one thing, while the fundamentalists have always had the capacity to pull crowds into the streets in protest, they've done surprisingly poor during any elections that have been held in the past (or so I've read). I mean, they don't even register as a blip at the ballot box. On the other hand, there's strong fundi influence in Pakistan's military and intelligence services (okay, I'll use the proper acronym "ISI"). That says nothing about "popular will," of course, but it does suggest that the fundies may have a capability to destabilize or even to seize power that we might not be fully aware of. If the fundies took power, of course, then you'd really have a dictatorship because they represent only a tiny minority of popular sentiment in the country. Anyway, if I were Musharraf, I'd be thinking very very hard about securing my base in the top officer ranks (a few well-chosen transfers and "promotions" of fundi officers might help), and making sure that the most immediately deployable military assets are in non-fundi hands. And then I'd put my best people (and a huge chunk of US aid) to the task of 1) providing immediate economic relief for the masses -- even creating a short-term welfare system where none now exists; and 2) creating an immediate alternative to the fundi madrassas schools that feed, clothe and "educate" so many poor children today. The let the fundis have their rallies. They'll have already lost the war.

David Kline (dkline) Fri Oct 5 '01 (09:25) 36 lines Yeah, that clip was almost unbearable to watch. And as many of you know, I've seen a lot of horrible things in Afghanistan. But there was a very special and un-Afghan ferocity to this beating that was awful to watch. I've been harping for weeks now about how the Taliban are completely alien to traditional Afghan character, custom and practice. I believe that within just a few weeks, the once-formidable Taliban regime will collapse. And then we will learn the full extent of Taliban cruelty. I mean, it's not just a crime against women that they are not allowed to work. Since as we all know so many many men are dead from 20 years of warfare, that edict has resulted in the mass starvation of widows and orphans. It's a crime against humanity. Afghans can't live without music. But millions have been forced to. They can't live without dancing, card playing, kite flying, laughter, jokes, sexual puns and innuendos, spoken poetry (such as the rhyming couplets called landays that men playfully chant to women & vice versa), and radio broadcast news. I mean, these people are real News Hounds -- just wait till they get the Net! Yet they've been forced to live without it. Really, a rather fun-loving (albeit quarrelsome) people have been forced to live without almost everything that matters to them. What an explosion of joy there will be when the Taliban are smashed! An I truly believe that despite the Afghan predisposition to factionalizing and plotting, once liberated they will find some way to hold a stable government together and start rebuilding. I know them -- they are NOT stupid. They know that it was precisely their factionalizing that laid the groundwork for the last decade of misery. An they will not make the same mistake again. Other mistakes, sure. But they won't let it get out of hand again, I'm convinced.

David Kline (dkline) Thu Oct 11 '01 (17:57) I am watching Pres. Bush's news conference. He just said two things that blew me away: Asked how Americans can be more alert, he said "Don't start picking on people who look different" or whose faith is different. Then he announced a national children's crusade for every American child to earn or send in $1 to help the children of Afghanistan, one out of 3 of whom are now orphans. You know, I'm sorry...maybe it's just because nobody gave a shit for 20 years about the Afghans, who I think are a wonderful gregarious joyful fun-loving and incredibly romantic people. But I have got to say I was incredibly moved by our President's words. "Our President." Never in my life did I think I would use those words. And you tell me, in how many other countries of the world would you EVER hear the national leader say either of the above statements? Two, maybe? Britain and Canada? Maybe? This is incredible to me. I have spent my 51 years of life (40 of them relatively conscious) as a staunch critic of American foreign policy. And now I am amazed. And deeply deeply proud and moved. I believe this is ultimately all going to be very very good for him.

David Kline (dkline) Thu Oct 11 '01 (17:07) 24 lines Ironically, it was Pyr Sayed Ahmed Gailani's son Ishaq Gailani who escorted me into the fighting areas on my first trip behind the lines in Afghanistan in September 1979. Their organization is the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, I think it's still called. Generally moderate, pro-Western and often educated folks in this group. But don't get the idea that just because the family owned a car dealership that they were wimps or anything. They actually did a fair amount of fighting early on -- took me to one helluva battle to seize a fort in Paktia province that left me vomiting with fear (I did that alot) by the side of a mountain trail. I have a great picture of Ishaq Gailani and his men -- then still armed for the most part with 1903 British Enfields that their great grandfathers took off dead British soldiers -- lined up behind a row of 250 kilo Russian bombs dropped by Mig-21s that somehow never exploded. Figures. 70 years of socialism and they still couldn't make a decent refrigerator, so why shouldn't half their bombs be duds, too. Anyway, his is not one of the major groups, but Gailani will still have to be included in any united front. The biggest wildcard will be Abdul Haq, profiled in the same article with Gailani. What he and Ismail Khan (now marching on Herat) do will go a long way toward determining the legitimacy of any post-Taliban regime.

Strategy: http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/12/international/12MILI.html The Times of London with additional details: http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/0,,2001350006-2001354120,00.html David Kline (dkline) Fri Oct 12 '01 (08:42) 17 lines Read both articles, which naturally are in contradiction to each other. . . . it does not look to me like the Home Team as yet has a military strategy for seizing Kabul from superior numbers of entrenched and fiercely-resistant Arab, Pakistani and Taliban fighters. I had thought two weeks ago that Kabul would have been weakly defended. But the Times reports Taliban reinforcements in strength around and in the capital. This is not the best news, but it doesn't change the end game. Galani, Abdul Haq, Ismail Khan and other former *leaders* (as opposed to mere warlords) are rallying forces, I believe. As soon as the Northern Alliance forms a coalition with all these forces and others -- and somehow they have to do it within like 1 week or so -- then a serious military strategy for the conquest of Kabul can be contemplated. But we've only got about 6 weeks or so. Then it gets really hard. And if we take a breather for the winter, the Taliban will claim victory.

David Kline (dkline) Fri Oct 12 '01 (08:47) 16 lines Sorry. The article that contradicts the London Times report that the battle of Kabul is only days away is another one from the Times, which reports that the US has deliberately avoided pounding Taliban positions around Kabul because we have a deal with Pakistan NOT to allow the Northern Alliance to seize the capital until a coalition government acceptable to Pakistan is worked out. Of course, if Pakistan balks at what the Afghans come up with, then we'll have to decide what to do: take out the Taliban, or keep Pakistan as ally. Or, as I've been suggesting for 17 years, we could always decide to stand up to the Paks for a change re: Afghanistan and see if they back down. But actually, on the question of a post-Taliban government, I do think they're right to press for a broader united front. But how broad and who? The devil may be in the details.

David Kline (dkline) Fri Oct 12 '01 (17:46) 31 lines how and why the in-fighting began. It was the Pakistani puppet and funamentalist freak Gulbuddin Hekmatyar -- the one that all of us warned the US about giving aid to -- who broke from the united fron (as usual) and began shelling the capital. With Pakistani military support. They backed him just like they later backed and installed the Taliban in power. This guy was the precurser to the Taliban. And before the Paks instructed him to break the united front and start a war (Pakistan did not want to see an independent government in Afghanistan, nor do they now), the Northern Alliance was a faily stable government that was and still is recognized by the UN and 46 countries. So yeah, chaos reined. But not because the Afghans are constitutionally unable to unite and form a stable government. It was because Pakistan deliberately tried to destabilize the new government. And succeeded. Now I don't want to make excuses for abuses of power. But remember, the ones who led the fighting against the Russians, who actually liberated the country and restored Afghan independence, were mostly not from the country's elite and educated and westernized class. They were often just barely-literate villagers, unaccustomed to governance and all the rest. As for their being quarrelsome, well that's not automatic failure. Plenty of other societies have had their "bad" periods or times of great internal conflict (the US Civil War?) and still managed to outgrow it and unite. Whatever their faults as a people (and they have many), one thing can surely be said about the Afghans: don't underestimate them. The Brits did, the Russians did. And paid for it. They are incredibly resourceful and I think they'll learn whatever they have to learn to survive. Including the "habits of democracy", if neccesary.

chilling thought: David Kline (dkline) Sun Oct 14 '01 (18:08) 15 lines Whatever the reason or cause, the bombing of innocent villagers represents such a threat to the survivability of the fragile anti-terror coalition that we should all be invoking the Gods to spare us another mistake. I'm not being critical. Believe me, I know there aren't 2 or 3 other countries in the world (if any) that would devote as much effort and concern towards avoiding civilian casualties as the US has. But all that effort and concern won't mean squat if the coalition breaks down the middle. That's why, if necessary for strategic reasons, I'd recommend that we stop the bombing and incurr greater casualties among our troops as a result -- anything to keep the coalition together! That's the key. If we lose Pakistan, we're toast. Not even America can defy the whole world for long.

Indeed...! Terrorism and anarchy will surely follow the dissolution of the coalition. Do you want to die a free man for freedom or die slowly and horribly at the hands of a madman in a world gone crazy. No one emerges from this war unscathed. If they think our stopping bombing is going to bring an end to this horror, they are sadly mistaken. The "wild bunch" has determined that we are the infidel and we deserve to die. They will not stop until either we put an end to it, or they win an most definitely Phyr ric victory!

Personally, I'd love to see B-52s carpet bomb Taliban front line positions. The NY Times said today that the Northern Alliance forces are explanation. I mean, why not just tell NA forces to retreat half-a-mile and then send in the B-1s and B-52s? From my experience watching many years of refugee relief efforts along the Afghan-Pakistan border during the 1980s, you really need people on the ground to do effective work -- either food, medical or whatever. So our food packets are not enough -- but then no one ever claimed they were. As I understand it, the Taliban are the greatest hindrance to relief efforts right now, if reports of their seizures of relief supplies and denial of access to relief workers are accurate. Our bombing doesn't help matters, but it's sufficiently localized that if the Taliban allowed it, food transport by truck to regional feeding centers could be achieved. In response to an earlier question about the pronounciation of Pathan or Pashtun or Pashtoon or whatever, everyone uses a different spelling. But the prounciation is usually "Posh-toon." Emphasis on the "posh" when referring to the people; and on the "toon" when referring to language. What's that Kipling poem about "if ever you are caught on the Afghan plains, better to roll on your gun and blow out your brains" then let the Afghans get you? During the 80s, we journalists had a helluva time trying to convince the Muj to keep their Russian prisoners alive. They were not at first greatly impressed by the phrase, "Geneva accords." If Taliban ever capture an American, however, you can be sure he will be kept alive and paraded on worldwide TV. Much more media savvy these days.

This is a complex, if not unprecedented, situation that we're all trying to make sense of on-the-fly with imperfect and incomplete information. A small tilt one way or another in, say, assessing the savvy of our military leaders from day to day can make a big difference in the viewpoint communicated in any one posting. There was an article in today's NY Times discussing Haq and the bogging down of our military effort. It quoted someone from the Center for Strategic Studies who said that the military keeps bombing and bombing -- in some part unwisely -- because that's what they know how to do. It's our natural blindspot, derived from our historical experience in war. It doesn't mean that we're uncapable of recalibrating our war effort, nor unable to learn and deploy new tactics, or that we're doomed to fail. Like you perhaps, , I'm a lifelong student of World War 2 and as you know, learning how to fight successfully did not come easy to us in that conflict. Many, many mistakes were made, and disasters wrought, especially during the first 14 months of that global war (until shortly after Torch). In fact, we came one-inch away from seeing Nazi fascism triumph throughout the world all because of a profound difference in strategy in late 1941 between the Chiefs of Staff under Marshall, which unanimously urged the abandonment of our Europe first strategy (because of Bitish stonewalling on a 2nd front), and Roosevelt who managed to resist their Japan first recommendations. Had he buckled under to them, we would have lost the war. Forgive the digression. It's meant just to acknowledge that success in war isn't miraculously pre-ordained but learned and earned only in the course of trial and error, as knowledge and experience grows. Hopefully we'll keep learning until we win. But I'm worried about our current direction, that's all. I know we're not razing cities, and cluster bombs (I hope) are only being used against troop concentrations, which is what they're designed for. But I think our present emphasis on bombing non-human assets is ill-advised, and reflects our military's experience in fighting *past wars*. I'd love to see much more thought and emphasis and resources committed to building Afghan capabilities. To me that's the only way to reliably win this war, and the only way to win it without losing all-important Muslim support completely. As for 30-40 km forced marches, I nearly died from them. But that's nothing for an Afghan, and I know that sounds like war lore but it's true -- these people are almost inhuman in their stamina. I don't know what Taliban units carry today, but the Mujahadeen I travelled with in the 80s could carry rifles, RPG's, ammo, 2-3 days food, a small amount of water, and stripped down "dashakas" (12.6 mm heavy machine guns) while literally running -- and I mean *running* -- up and over 10,000-12,000 foot mountain passes in a non-stop day-long advance without even pausing for rest. During the early years I was there, communication was solely by messenger. And I'm sure that with some of their communications severed, the Taliban are relying again in some cases on runners. I forget the distance from Kandahar to Kabul, but whatever -- these people can move so rapidly in any terrain that the use of runners becomes a viable military option for them. Amazing, but true. - source, David Kline

Ask Herman Neuman about what WW2 was like. (Books conference toopic 31) Megalomanics seem to come to power periodically to relieve the population crunch. That is the only way I can understand this horrific impulse to destroy life and civilization. We cope as best we can. David Kline has put a face on this horror just as Herman Neuman did for me for WW2.

It's not an either-or kind of thing. Short term, we need to use violence to attempt to destroy the operational ability of Al-Queda and to oust the Taliban in order to eliminate Afghanistan as a staging area for global terrorism. Long term, we need to use politics -- including a frank admission of past errors in the Islamic world (e.g., Shah of Iran) -- to isolate the Muslim extremists from the broad masses of ordinary Muslim citizens. In some ways, we can borrow a page from our mostly successful effort against communism. Military might to contain overt aggression, combined with protracted political, economic and even philosophical struggle against communist ideology. It took decades, but we won. Same thing here, I think. David Kline.

David Kline (dkline) Mon Oct 29 '01 (09:05) 25 lines God, I can just imagine snow-mobiling up in the Afghan mountains and going over a tiny little ridge and ... dropping a thousand feet. Ugh. As for all our high-tech gizmos, I know there's a place for that. But ultimately, I think we'll need the kind of guys that can sneak up quieter than an Afghan on a Taliban encampment and cut the throats of a dozen men. Let's say we devoted 1/1000th of our present efforts and resources to seriously enhancing the military capabilities of the Northern Alliance, Ismael Khan, and other anti-Taliban forces. Do people here think that in time, with money and equipment, we could help construct a force powerful enough to oust the Taliban? I've been suggesting this sort of redirection of effort away from city bombing. And I think it would work, but I'm not sure if I'm being fully objective about it. All I know is, even the NY Times talks about the "tepid" US effort to build a broad-based coalition, and our "perfunctory" coordination of military action with NA forces. So clearly, we're not putting a whole lot of effort into this -- to me it looks like the same old go-it-alone approach by the U.S. But I'm just wondering if people here think that this is appropriate and that there's little chance of helping to build an effective Afghan fighting force, or if they think we should put more effort into it. I think we're exaggerating the venality of the Afghan resistance. First off, the primary reasons why things went to hell after the Soviets were defeated were not simply because of Afghan quarrelsomeness -- that's always existed, even during decades of peace. Rather: 1) The US abandoned the reconstruction of Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. Economic aid would have been a stabilizing factor, and it could have been contingent on maintaining peace between factions. 2) Pakistani sabotage -- first in instigating Hekmatyar to quit the coalition government and start shelling the capital, and second in arming, financing and directing the Taliban to take power. As for warlords, etc., partly that's always been true of Afghanistan -- again, even in times of peace. But I also wouldn't get all high & mighty about how screwed up they are. If we had suffered proportionately -- 26 million dead, 65 million living as refugees -- we might have a few rapists and warlords running around, too. In any event, we are not presented with any perfect options. Consider: 1) We could try to exterminate the Taliban all by ourselves and then quit Afghanistan again, but that'd leave another mess there *for sure* and it'd also turn the whole Muslim world against us. 2) Simply going home & leaving the Taliban in power won't work either. 3) Against those options, I think it's entirely reasonable to devote serious economic, political and military help to anti-Taliban factions and trying to create a stable, non-terrorist regime in Afghanistan. Unless I'm forgetting something, it's the only choice we have.

David Kline (dkline) Thu Nov 1 '01 (10:13) 8 lines My wife says I've been having nightmares about my Afghan war reporting days, crying out about bombs falling and people being torn apart. I haven't had nightmares like these since I quit covering the war in 1988. These are heavy heavy times we're living in. But still I can't help thinking that there'll be a great many positive results from all of us having to learn to deal with our fears -- and from recognizing more than ever before just how precious life, love and family truly are.

He's right. Just hope you have found the right soul mate. It is difficult to deal with the war and worry when there is no love at home...

David Kline (dkline) Sun Nov 4 '01 (16:55) 56 lines One interesting but little-studied aspect of the WTC disaster is the role that intellectual property is playing in helping to make our economy more resistant to terrorist attack. Consider that intellectual assets have now replaced tangible assets as the chief form of corporate wealth -- accounting for approximately 70% of the total market value of the S&P 500 today. This is also true even among manufacturing firms, where the asset base has shifted just in the last 20 years or so from one in which physical assets such as plant, equipment and real property constituted 62 percent of firm market value in 1982, to one in which such assets represent less than 30% of firm value today (the other 70% of firm value being composed now of intellectual assets). Put another way, the business battles once fought for control of markets and raw materials are increasingly being waged over the exclusive rights to new ideas and new innovations. How does this make our economy more resistant to terrorist attack? When the WTC was attacked, America sustained untold billions of dollars in real property and other economic losses. There's no doubt that consumer and other markets were severely affected. But the underlying health of the U.S. economy -- the intellectual asset strength that currently underlies 70% of the market value of all public companies in America -- remains largely unaffected. Indeed, in the case of Cantor Fitzgerald, which lost 700 of its 1,000 employees on September 11, intellectual property may even "help shape the firm's rebuilding effort," noted the Wall Street Journal (10/25/01 "Cantor Fitzgerald Wins Round in Patent Dispute"). A patent governing online futures trading that it bought last April for $1.75 million could bring in as much as $100 million in new licensing revenue this year -- double the 2000 revenues of the business unit (called eSpeed) that Cantor spun-off in 1999 to manage this patent, according to J.P. Morgan analyst Greg Smith. In the words of Cantor Fitzgerald CEO Howard Lutnick: "Intellectual property is a fundamental asset of [ours], and that's never been more obvious and important than now." The fact of the matter is that the U.S. economy no longer depends as much as it used to upon access to raw materials, manufacturing plant or other physical assets, which can be interrupted or even destroyed by terrorist attack. The good news from all of this is that America's fundamental economic strength -- its knowledge-based economy that outpaces the rest of the world in the production of new ideas and new innovations -- is largely impervious to Al-Queda assault. Indeed, only one nation on earth currently relies on its own innovative strength to produce the majority of its science and technology assets -- the United States. All other nations, even Germany and Japan, import over 50% of the science and technology needed in their economies from abroad (chiefly from the U.S.). Our intellectual property strength not only makes us more resilient against terrorist attack, it also provides us with the innovative new tools and technologies we'll need to fight modern-day terrorism.

David Kline: One of my favorite Herat stories involves yours truly, as a semi-sentient 18-year-old hitchiking around the world in 1968. I had just passed through the Iran-Afghan border at Mashad and hitched a ride into Herat. I knew to play it cool, as King Zahir Shah's rule was reported to be very strict. While walking near the city center, a policeman braced me. He demanded to see my passport. "Hmmm ... Ah-merry-con?" he asked, flipping the pages of my passport. "Yes," I replied helpfully. He paused, looked at me curiously. "You have hasheesh?" he demanded. "Oh no, no hashish!" I lied. "No?" he repeated. "Well then here ..." he laughed, handing me a little packet of dope and enjoying my surprise. "Welcome to Afghanistan!" Man, what a lost world that is. I arrived in Luxembourg in August of 1968 with no return ticket and a hundred dollars in my pocket. Spent the first 2 months travelling around western Europe and Scandinavia, then with my last dollar took the Orient Express to Istanbul. Whereupon my passport was promptly stolen and I slowly began to starve. So I learned how to help tourists in Istanbul's Grand Bazaar find what they were looking for (for a fee), and I hooked up with a minor Turkish gangster who paid me to smuggle cars from Bulgaria into Turkey. Dumb dumb dumb ... but that's what being 18 is all about, I guess. Anyway, I fled Turkey the night before a major "Midnight Express" bust of foreign hash smokers in Istanbul and made my way to Iran, where I met and stayed with members of the fledling anti-Shah resistance. From there I wandered into Afghanistan and then up and over the Khyber Pass at last into to Pakistan, where thanks to dysentery (sp), I arrived in Peshawar weighing exactly 121 pounds. Had no money for medical care, the US consulate laughed in my face (just as it did in Kabul when I snuck in in 1981 posing as an importer with Pier 1 imports and he refused to offer me shelter one hour before a Soviet shoot-on-sight curfew fell), but I managed to get enough money for medicine by selling hash to hippies. Then I went to India, spent a few months in Goa, went to Nepal, then swung around back through Southeast Asia and after a year gone then back home through Hawaii where, genius that I am, I figured I could just breeze through customs wearing a body vest holding 6 kilos of the finest Nepalese government-stamped hashish on earth. But that's another story. Now, I just sit home playing with my five month old and growing old probably a little less than gracefully.

David Kline (dkline) Thu Nov 15 '01 (11:43) 52 lines Omar and Bin Laden are toast. Remember 4 weeks ago how we were talking about how when the regime started to crumble, Afghan (not Arab) Taliban might strike a deal to kill or turn over Bin Laden to NA or US forces? It looks like this may be exactly what happens. I pray that the Afghans try him and hang him. There's no martyrdom for him if he's executed by a newly-liberated nation of devout Muslims. And Afghans are devout Muslims. They're just not fanatics or fundamnetalist Muslims. Did anyone see today's huge color picture in the NY Times of Afghan women bathing and washing clothes in a river? Miraculous! Wonderful! And they really are quite a handsome race of women, with ready smiles. And to think just 8 weeks ago most Americans thought: "Oh those terrible Afghans, look how they treat their women." Now everyone can see without doubt that, no, it's only how 7th century fanatical village idiots treat their women. The news gets better and better. Order in the streets. Few if any reprisals, even against the bastards who assasinated the two greatest and most beloved living Afghans -- Ahmed Shah Massoud and Abdul Haq. I spoke to Abdul Haq's nephew last night -- the man Abdul Haq raised as his own son when his father (Haq's brother) was killed in battle against the Soviets. And now, in full loving circle, this nephew is now raising Abdul Haq's son as his own, no different than his other children. Okay, I gotta stop getting teary now ... Anyway, Haq's nephew and I shared some stories and some sense of final victory, of peace at last. And I realized something that had not occured to me before: the Afghans I have known and lived with have always been struggling, always fighting, always burying their children, always on the run, never giving up, but always living with fear and hunger and brutality all their lives. And now, for the first time last night, I heard an Afghan crying out his joy and gratitude to God for that which they have hoped and prayed for so long. Peace. Normalcy. A chance to go back to their farms and raise babies and later teach them to fly kites (which no one does better than Afghans) and once more play their instruments around village campfires spitted with cooking lamb and great God even to sing and dance at weddings again! I'm sorry to be so sentimental about this. But the transformation in their lives is su huge, so rich, and so justly deserved.

David Kline (dkline) Fri Nov 16 '01 (08:57) 96 lines And here's another reason, besides the dreaded ISI that I had to dodge for 10 fucking years while over, that I don't like Pakistanis: they inherited and then exaggerated the British penchant for bureaucratism. Here's a short scene from my screenplay "Bazaar" (a love story set against the backdrop of the Afghan war -- "Year of Living Dangerously"-style). It'll give you a very accurate taste of the Pakistani way of things. The backdrop is that the lead character NATE (a jounalist -- surprise!) has been called in for questioning by the local ISI commander. As with everything involving Pakistani, it is 110 degrees with 90% humidity. For those unfamiliar with screenplay terminology, EXT. means an exterior shot, and INT. obviously means an inside a building shot. _____________________________________________ EXT. SPECIAL BRANCH HEADQUARTERS - LATER It is a huge, stone-walled compound the color of caked mud, fronted by large, swinging iron gates. Atop these gates a sign reads: "NORTHWEST FRONTIER POLICE - SPECIAL BRANCH." Sentries armed with rifles, bamboo riot sticks and the arrogance of power push and club a mayhem of supplicants. The supplicants-- businessmen in dirty suits, women with crying babies--wave little slips of paper like religious icons at the unseeing guards. INT. WAITING ROOM - SPECIAL BRANCH The pitted stone walls look like they haven't been painted in a century. Nate sits on a rickety old chair, legs splayed out and head tilted back, sweating heavily and gazing up at a ceiling fan that barely moves. Flies are having their way with him. He hears the MUFFLED ECHOES of men shouting and women pleading somewhere in the compound. He looks at his watch, then sits up and speaks to the RECEPTIONIST. NATE Does he know I'm waiting? The receptionist, a fat, unshaven man in local clothes, pokes at a typewriter. TAP . . . TAP. He ignores Nate. TAP . . . TAP. NATE Excuse me . . . RECEPTIONIST (torpid, indifferent) Yes okay. TAP . . . TAP . . . TAP. He pulls the paper from the typewriter and, with unbearable slowness, carefully applies a dab of white- out. He fans it dry with his sweaty palm. Pleased with his work, he leans over and hawks some phlegm onto the floor. He wipes his hand across his mouth, drawing out a long streamer of yellow spit. He sees it, wipes his mouth again with his other hand. Then he reaches for the typing paper, smearing it with his spittle, and re-inserts it in the typewriter. NATE (trying to keep calm) Excuse me . . . RECEPTIONIST I have tell him. NATE You have told . . . RECEPTIONIST (TAP, TAP) Yes sir. NATE When? RECEPTIONIST Now. NATE (beat) Excuse me. You *have* told him? Or you *will* tell him? RECEPTIONIST Yes sir. Nate falls back against the chair, his head rolling back. ______________________________________________ And so it goes, another day in the romantic life of a war correspondent.

"The Death of Masoud": Vice magazine interviews a Brit journalist named Jason Florio, who interviewed Masoud shortly before his assasination, and who was also in New York on Sept 11. http://www.viceland.com/issues/v8n8/htdocs/afghanistan.php Report in the LA Times today about the situation in Herat: a myor's race; NA soldiers breaking up a pro-King really, the usual stuff that never would have even existed 5 ndays ago (unless it was 25 years ago, in which case this sort of thing was daily life for Afghans). But there's a very funny bit that shows the dry humor of Afghans under the worst of circumstances. Ismael Khan (gotta love an old-fashioned "warlord" who runs schools for 75,000 girls while being chased by Soviet special forces troops for 10 years) is complaining aboiut the fact that the Northern Alliance "can't get no respect," as it were. He was recently quoted (including here) as saying he didn't want a long term presence of Western troops in Afghanistan (which if he'd been a Sandinista, would have earned him praise as an anti-imperialist but since Afghans can't do anything right in the minds of "progressives" only earns him a rep as "ungrateful" or even anti-American). Anyway, the reporter notes that while Khan in this interviemade a point of NOT criticizing American involvement, 'US efforts took a plunge of sorts" when several 1,000-pound crates of pre-packaged meals from America "crashed through the roof of the famous Sunni Muslim philosopher's shrine" as well as the outhouse of a "local resident." Commented local resident Habib Allah Nour Ahmad: "If they do not drop these things in such places, it is better." Also in the "Northern Alliance cxan't get no respect" department, the ever-whining spokeswoman for RAWA was on NewsHour last night again demanding that the NA NOT be allowed to participate in any future government of Afghanistan because many of its members are not in favor of full human rights for women. In other words, because many NA members are simple village men and not college-educated Afghans who have enjoyed these past 20 years living in the safety of London or New York or other Western capitals. My response: How many Taliban have you killed, miss? Oh excuse me, let's go back further: how many Russians have you killed? Because to me that's got to surely be one of the major pre-requisites forf participation in a post-Taliban solution: who actually fought for and sacrificed for the liberation of Afghan men, children and yes women? Now it is true that some RAWA members made great sacrifices. But hardly more, I suspect, then the millions of uneducated (and therefore sometimes backward-thinking) men who gave their lives over the past 25 years. So give it a rest Tameenya or whatever your name is. Watch her the next time she gves an interview. I will pay you $50 if her response to the first question asked -- no matter what that question is -- is not the following: "Yes, but first I want to say that the fundamentalists of the Northern Alliance must NOT be allowed to participate in the future government of Afghanistan." You heard the offer: $50 to anyone who watches her speak and doesn't hear her say the above. You know what RAWA's real problem is. Sure, they're sectarian like everyone else. But that's not their real problem. Their real gripe is that for better or worse (and it is for worse I'll agree) most ordinary Afghans don't yet have the same prtogressive views re: the role of women as RAWA does. And RAWA doesn't want to have to have to wage the long-term political effort needed to educate their fellow citizens, man and women. Well boo-hoo ladies. French women had to fight like hell just to get the right to vote AFTER World War 2. We all know what women everywhere have had to do to fight for their rights & stop mistreatment. Just because RAWA crybabies can't stand it that many Afghan women still prefer the veil (if not i8n many cases the burqa) is not sufficient reason, to my mind, to disqualify from the political [rocess the VERY PEOPLE who made this politic al process and this liberation possible. So on this Thanksgiving, I want to give thanks to the 10 million or more ordinary Afghan men and women -- people of all different levels of political progressivesness and backwardness -- who gave up their livesor their homes and families to keep the faith these long 25 years and broing about this miracle of liberation in their wounded nation today. And as my extended family reminded me last nigght, we should also thank them for giving me back 10 years of my life there that, until September 11, had been forgotten by me and ignored by everyone else. They gave me back some meaning to it, and for that I'm very greatful. A small thing when stacked up against what's happening., but important for me no note on Thanksgiving Dayu. I hate this unfamiliar keyboard I'm on. Sorry for all the misspellings.

David Kline (dkline) Thu Nov 22 '01 (13:38) 37 lines My point is not that RAWA doesn't deserve to be praised for whatever good work they've done, or that they ashouldn't be asllowed to partici[pate in the future political process of their country. They should! My point was that they should stop demanding that oters NOT get to play a role -- especially whyen it is those others who more than anyone else, for better or worse, have brought about the liberation thyat now enables a new political process! I mean, what hypoocrisy! They can scream all they want about the "crimes" of the NA and others, but if we're gonna start tallying up "crimes, " well RAWA has a few of its own to explain in the way they invited and supported Soviet advisors into their country in the late 1970s. Educatiuon of women? Yes, RAWA has done great work, but did they educate more girls than NA so-called worlord Ismael Khan, who put 75,000 girls through school? The point is, they have to stop bickering and condemning othyers (the curse of all Afgfhan factions) and start working together. In any event, I guarantee you that the LAST thing that is going to happen is that the armed resistance forces most responsible for the liberation of the country are going to be denied the right to participate. That's ludicrous, and it'll never happen. So it's time for RAWA to put the nation ahead of its socialist agenda, just like it's time for this or that faction of the NA to put aside it's own particular agenda for the goodf of the whole nation. And actually, that's what'll happen, despite all the blame-laying and screaming. Because it's either work together, or die as a nation. And the Afghans are not suicidal. They'll work it out.

David Kline (dkline) Mon Dec 3 '01 (10:16) 33 lines Yesterday, the New York Times reported that the first woman in five years had registered at Kabul University -- a college that once had 3,500 female students before the Taliban came to power. A brief excerpt: __________________________ Escorted by her father into the chancellery building of Kabul University at 8:40 this morning, Farida Afzali, 21, had no idea she was walking into history. She reacted to the half- dozen staring men the way she would have in the past. She bowed her head and looked at the floor. When a question was shouted, she let her father answer. "Yes," he said, beaming and granting her permission to give an interview. "You should speak bravely and courageously." For the next hour, Ms. Afzali talked about what it was like to be the first woman in five years to register for classes at Kabul University. ` __________________________ When you read the full article, you'll know why I feel that with women like Ms. Afzali around, Afghanistan's future is bound to be bright. http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/02/international/asia/02SCHO.html?searchpv=past7 days

David Kline (dkline) Wed Jan 9 '02 (15:51) 58 lines Sebastian Junger has a very nice article in the new Vanity Fair entitled "Massoud's Last Conquest." He quotes Massoud when he was in Europe last April trying to rally the West to presure Pakistan to stop maintaining the Taliban in power: "If I could say one thing to President Bush," Massoud said at a pess conference in Paris, "it would be that if he doesn't take care of what is happening in Afghanistan [by forcing Pakistan to stop backing the Taliban], the problem will not only hurt the Afghan people but the American people as well." But while the State Dept. refused to listen, it seems some in the US counter-terrorism community understood the wisdom of Massoud's request for help. According to Junger, one high-level counter-terrorism official acknowledged to him, "Counter-terrorism means getting bin Laden, and the best way to do that is to help Massoud." One thing I've always liked about Junger's Afghan reportage is that he's one of the few who really grasps the central role of the Pakistanis in fueling the Islamic fundamentalist threat not only in Pakistan but around the world. An excerpt from his Vanity Fair article: "For decades the United States had essentially followed Pakistan's lead when it came to Afghan policy. During the Soviet occupation, America relied on Pakistan to put $3 billion worth of weapons and support into the hands of the mujahadeen. It was all funnelled through the ISI, the infamous Pakistani intelligence service, and many of the weapons wound up in the hands of anti-Western fanatics. "The power vacumn that followed the 1989 Soviet withdrawal was finally filled by the Taliban, the creation of fundamentalist lunatics recruited by the ISI from the refguee camps on the Afghan border. By 1996, Pakistan had created a rogue state that exported two-thirds of the world's heroin, brutalized its citizens with harsh Islamic laws, and hosted a terrorism network dedicated to destroying the West." Junger then mentions State Department disinterest in terrorism and oil company interest in a potential oil and gas pipeline across Afghanistan. "While American counter-terrorism efforts struggled to contain the threat posed by Osama bin Laden, oil interests and Pakistani intelligence were holding American policy firmly by the ear." One final note: I've gone back over more of my articles on the Afghan situation from the 1980s, and I see that on a number of occasions I warned of the dangers of allowing Pakistani intelligence to use our money and arms to create a powerful anti-Western army of extremists in Afghanistan. And I was by no means the only one. I know that in hindsight all issues look clearer than they do when you're actually facing them in real time. But I don't believe it's fair to say that there's NOTHING we could have done to prevent September 11 -- that there were NO warnings about the growing threat of fundamentalist extremism that we could have acted upon in some way. There was also a certain amount of myopia at work here, although I doubt this will ever be acknowledged by the powers-that-be.

David Kline: Well, whaddya know. Less than a year ago, women in Afghanistan were being executed in public stadiums and beaten like dogs on the street. Today, an Afghan woman received 171 votes for President of the nation, out of about 1,500 cast at the Loya Jirga assembly. Although she came in way behind Hamid Karzai's 1200 or so votes (I'm not sure of the numbers, having only caught it on the radio), she appartently defeated another male candidate for second place position. This is *Afghanistan* folks. Who says life isn't full or miracles? 1295 votes out of 1575 cast http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/south_asia/newsid_2042000/2042040.stm "The people of Afghanistan are acquiring [their] voice for the first time in 23 years." -- a senior advisor to Hamid Karzai

David Kline today: I support the U.S. role in Afghanistan. In fact, I think it should be strengthened. And I certainly do not condemn Washington in the abstract for causing civilian casualties; I know some are necessary and the Afghans know it and accept it as well. The question is, if our military tactics are causing *unneccesary* casualties, and as a result straining our alliance with the Afghans while not appreciably reducing enemy strength or capability, then shouldn't we make some adjustments in those tactics? Although overall I think the U.S. has done an excellent job in Afghanistan, I do think we've erred at times in relying too much on airpower. Some of you may recall that in this forum last October I criticized our "bombing-only" approach and argued that taking out fuel depots (or Red Cross hospitals) was of little benefit and that we should instead put some Special Forces troops on the ground to work with the Northern Alliance and help kickstart anoffensive against the Taliban. Subsequently we learned that in mid- and late-October, the American command was debating precisely the ame question, and when they finally decided to use Special Forces to help organize a military offensive by the Northern Alliance, the Taliban fell like a house of cards. (Of course, the debate wasn't just between the advocates of airpower vs. ground action; the Pentagon also needed to finally reject Pakistani and State Department fears of a Northern Alliance conquest of power without a political solution having been devised.) More recently, I've argued that our *tactical* over-reliance on airpower was producing uneccsary civilian casualites and straining our alliance with the Afghans. Many Afghans and some in the U.S. military argue that we'd be far more effective militarily and politically by deploying ground forces against suspected Al Queda pockets rather than bombing them. By the way, perhaps I mispoke when I refered to the American military's *traditional* over-reliance on airpower. It just seems to me that since the days of Vietnam, our generals have oftentimes believed that they could accomplish a lot more with airpower than in reality they could. Anyway, as events in Afghanistan have certainly proved, bombing alone -- or bombing as our *principal* tactic -- can lead to many problems and in any event cannot be relied upon to achieve our objectives. So I just want to make clear my critique is tactical only, and I believe that on the whole we've done a really great job in Afghanistan. We helped overthrow the first-ever terrorist-owned state power, and helped liberate the Afghans from a horrific tyranny. I hope we have the wisdom to avoid frittering away these gains, and to consolidate them through stepped up economic, political and military support of the fledgling government.

I have been watching CBS Sunday morning and they just showed an exhibit of remarkable photos about 9/11/ The photols were mounted without frames, hung with binder clips on long wires which criss crossed the big galeery in NYV. Just before this, they had done a piece on the music that relates to 9/11. Tim Buckey. The Who. Steve Earl. Bruce Springsteen. James Taylor (Fire and Rain). Alan Jackson. Then I read this piece by David Kline about this thoughts a year after 9/11. David Kline (dkline) Sun Sep 8 '02 (07:14) 36 lines The roots of this "clash of civilizations" goes way back, in one form or another, for centuries. This is true of all greta historic trends. The epic struggle between communism and capitalism, for example, had roots that went way back to at least the mid-19th century, right? And yet there are defining moments when the opposing historical forces -- or rather, the people involved in them -- become "conscious" of each other and of the enormous stakes involved in their conflict's outcome. In the struggle between capitalism and communism, the defining moment was the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. That's when the whole world saw that an epic battle had been joined, and it was time to choose sides. In the clash between Western enlightenment democracy and Islamic obscurantist fundamentalism (will somebody please think of a better headline to define this?), I can't think of a single defining moment right now -- except maybe the assassination of Sadat, or maybe the Iranian revolution and overthrow of the Shah, or maybe one or two other possible momentous events. But we should look for that defining moment sometime in the late 1970s or early 1980s period. I was a reporter in the Islamic world then. And I remember how it seemed almost suddenly like everything changed. All of a sudden, all issues seemed to be defined against the backdrop of the rise of fundamentalism. Little groups which had previously seemed to be not much more than purist radical sects suddenly had "reach" -- the ability to attract public and media and governmental attention -- even though their memberships had not grown from one day to the next. And the members of these Jihadist sects suddenly had a sense of their "historic mission," if you will. Anyway, while this clash of civilizations has deep roots, it only became an active, "conscious" determinant of global human development about 20 years ago, I think. Or at least that's how I'm seeing things at 7:15 AM Sunday morning after being up with the baby sindce 5 AM.

David Kline (dkline) Wed Sep 11 '02 (09:17) 15 lines Regarding Bin Laden and Iraq, there are no deep ties between them and there is a fundamental and irreconcilable schism of outlook. However, Bin Laden has previously made use of America's attacks on Iraq to bolster his call to Jihad. Shortly after 9/11, I believe, Bin Laden issued a video where he made specific reference to the suffering that the Iraqi masses have endured as a result of U.S. attacks and sanctions. Of course, in that same video, he attacked sell-out Arab and Muslim leaders. But yes, a new American assault on Iraq would be a Godsend to Bin Laden. I believe he would make a public appearance in response to such an attack, and position himself as the leader of all the world's Muslims by calling anew for global Jihad ahgainst the Jews and Americans. We couldn't give our enemies a better gift than to attack Iraq right now.

David Kline (dkline) on Tue, Oct 8, '02 Although I have read some of Thomas L. Friedman's post-9/11 foreign affairs columns in the New York Times, I only this past weekend read the whole collection of them (for which he received his third Pulitzer Prize) contained in his new book, "Longitudes and Attitudes." And I must say I was deeply impressed with the clarity of his vision of the meaning of 9/11 and the nature of the challenge we face in combatting fundamentalist terror. You may have read my posts in this conference on the "clash of civilizations" between the modern, pluralistic and democratic social systems of the West and the backward, obscurantist and anti-modern ideology of fundamentalist Islam. Well, Friedman quite rightly rejects that formulation, pointing out that what the world really needs is a war *within* Islam to defeat the forces of Jihadist fundamentalism. There are two basic components of Friedman's vision in "Longitudes and Attitudes that I think are very much worth discussing and debating: 1) We must ruthlessly hunt down and kill Bin Laden and the other leaders of fundamentalist terror groups. No quarter can be given in this battle. 2) But we must also adopt a non-imperialist, united front foreign policy that seeks to encourage modernist, moderate and secular forces within Islam to finally confront the cancer of fundamentalism that threatens not only their own societies but the whole world as well. Unless we do so, new Bin Ladens will always emerge and the ultimate battle will be lost. Assuming there is interest in these issues, I would like to post some of the columns (or portions of columns) from his book as catalysts for discussion in this topic. I encourage others to do the same. Again, I was extremely impressed with Friedman's clarity of vision. Perhaps that's because he says more or less what I have been trying to say here for the past year -- only he say it much better (which is why he won the Pulitzer, not me, of course). As someone who has spent years in the Muslim world, I can assure you that Friedman knows what he is talking about. His achievement was to synthesize his "behind the veil" observations of Muslim societies into a broad-brush vision of how to wage the "War on Terror" in a way that leads to a world we want to live in.